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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
JAMES JOHN LATSIS (some-
times known as "Latses' ') 
Deceased. 
No. 7954 
PETITION OF APPELLANTS 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. This Court on rehearif/a. holds that the October de-
cree is unconditional that it afforded no notice 
to bonafide purchasers of the conditions contained 
in the February decree. This court erred in hold-
ing that Mrs. Latses, who had complete knowledge 
of the conditions, was also protected by this decree. 
2. On rehearing this Court reversed its first opinion 
by assigning a different meaning to the word "refer'' 
than to the word "incorporate'' when in fact they are 
synonymou~ When an order refers to an earlier con-
ditional order, it is the same as incorporating the 
earlier conditional order within itself. 
3. This Court falls into the error Mr. Justice Wolfe 
cautioned against in the estate of McLaren. Even 
though the rights of heirs in their separate capaci-
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ties as contracting parties could be put in issue in 
a probate proceeding, process must be served on 
the heirs to bring them before the Court. If no 
process is served upon them in their separate capa-
. . ' C1hes as contracting parties, they have not had their 
day in Court and the October order would be a void 
order. 
4. The petition for final distribution did not invoke 
the jurisdiction of the probate court on a matter 
of probate, namely - distribution under the laws of 
succession. Probate includes a determination of the 
persons who by laws of succession are decreed to be 
the distributees of the property of the decedent and 
secondly an adjudication of the proportions or parts 
which each has received upon the death of the an-
cestor. A probate proceeding is not completed until 
these steps are taken. 
This Court failed to accord the same dignity to 
another decree of the probate court, namely - the 
February decree which is itself a final judgment on 
the matters there passed on by the Court. The 
February decree could only be reversed in a direct 
proeeeding for that purpose. To initiate such a direct 
proceeding, service of citation upon the heirs is re-
quired. The statutory notice, held to be sufficient 
in Barrette vs. Whitney is not such a notice a's meets 
this requirement. 
5. That the error set forth in the next preceding para-
graph, raises a constitutional question under the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. The property rights 
vested hy a judgment of this Court in the February 
decree are taken away from the non-resident heirs 
without due process. The opinion of this Court on 
rehearing holds that the February Court Order made 
a binding agreement for the parties. The vested 
contract right of the non-resident heirs, to receive 
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their full distributive share of this estatP, was taken 
from thmn without due process of law hy thP Octo-
ber decree. 
EYen if thP Court adhere8 to its opinion that the 
October order is a Yalid probate decree and conclu-
sive, the non-resident heirs haYP pleaded a ean~e of 
action for negligence against the admini~trators and 
of fraud and collusion between the administrators 
on the one hand and :J[rs. Latses as one of the heir:-; 
on the other hand. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This preliminary statement is intended as back-
ground to the principles of law set forth in this Brief in 
support for the petition for rehearing. 
A proceeding in probate is a special proceeding and 
the only types of decrees or judgments that are binding 
are those which deal with "matters of probate." Origin-
ally probate courts would hear only probate matters in a 
probate proceeding. The Utah Code has relaxed the rule 
and permits a probate court to pass upon matters of 
equitable jurisdiction which are not matters in probate. 
The statutory notice provided for in a probate proceed-
ing can give notice only of the matters in probate. When-
ever matters other than matters in probate are brought 
before the probate court, in order to provide due process 
of law, it is necessary that process be served upon all 
parties who are intended to be bound by the judgment in 
the non-probate proceeding. 
As applied to the Latses case, the petition which is 
relied upon by Mrs. Latses as invoking the jurisdiction 
of this court to make ''distribution" of the assets of this 
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estate, was in fact a non-probate proceeding. This is 
made fully apparent by a reading of the petition (R.107, 
paragraph!~ 5 and 6). These two paragraphs show the 
petition invoked the jurisdiction of the court to give 
affect to a stipulation entered into between all of the 
heirs, to divide the estate of the decedent, not according 
to the statutes of ta descent, but in accordance with a 
contract entered into by the heirs. To divide an estate 
in a n1anner other than provided by the laws of succes-
sion (where the decedent does not leave a Will) consti-
tutes a non-probate matter. 'rhe order which that peti-
tion gave rise to made no probate determination, it no-
where appearing in the order, the shares or the propor-
tions of the estate which each of the heirs was entitled to 
receive, according to the laws of succession. The only 
matter which it purports to adjudicate is. the rights of 
each of the heirs as contracting parties under the stipu-
lation and F'ebruary order of the court and it is a non-
probate order and it is not a decree of "distribution." 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT ON REHEARING HOLDS THAT THE 
OCTOBER DECREE IS UNCONDITIONAL BECAUSE 
IT AFFORDED NO NOTICE 'TO BONAFIDE PURCHASERS 
OF THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THE FEBRUARY 
DECREE. THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MRS. 
LATSES, WHO HAD COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
CONDITIONS, WAS ALSO PROTECTED BY THIS DECREE. 
When the former opinion was entered, Amici Curiae 
had not submitted a Brief. Some of the attorneys re-
presented Amici Curiae who actually were persons who 
harl purchased real property from Virginia Latses, dis·· 
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tributee of this estate. These attorneys brought to the 
attention of the Court the problems of such subsequent 
purchasers of the real property of this estate and the 
opinion on rehearing indicates that the Court had in 
mind the rights of such subsequent purchasers and de-
sired to protect the property rights which had heen ac-
quired by these subsequent purchasers. The Court's se-
eond opinion concerns itself wholly with the right of 
such subsequent purchasers and considers not at all the 
substantive property rights of the immediate parties 
to the probate proceeding. 
Of all of the property affected by these probate 
proceedings, Blackacre alone was sold. Greenacre, White-
acre and Redacre still stand in the name of Mrs. Latses. 
Agreeing fully with the rationale of the courts opinion, 
we could understand why the October decree would pro-
tect the bonafide purchasers of Blackacre, but there are 
no bonafide purchasers of Greenacre, Whiteacre and 
Redacre. The rights of the non-resident heirs in Green-
acre, Whiteacre and Redacre are not prejudiced by any 
intervening rights of bonafide purchasers for value. If 
it be conceded that the non-resident heirs have lost their 
title insofar as Blackacre is concerned by reason of the 
intervening rights of purchasers for value, still, they 
have not lost their vested property rights in Greenacre, 
Whiteacre and Redacre, which properties are still re-
tained by Mrs. Latses and as to which properties, the 
rights of bonafide purchasers for value are not involved. 
Under the provisions of Section 75-14-16 UCA 53, 
this Court could very well hold that the rights of suhse-
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quent purchasers for value are fully protected by the 
October decree. That Statute reads: 
"When a judgment or decree is made deter-
mining any matter affecting the title to property 
a certified copy of the same must be recorded in 
the office of the recorder of the county in which 
the property is situated; and from the time of 
filing the same notice of the contents thereof is 
imparted to all persons." 
Bonafide purchasers having constructive notice of 
the October decree from the date of recording could rely 
upon it and be protected by it. Thus, the purchaser of 
Blackacre would be protected, but that statute would 
not protect Mrs. Latses who had actual notice rather 
than constructive notice of the fact that the distribution 
to her was conditional upon the execution and delivery 
to her of assignments of the interest of the non-resident 
heirs and of the execution and delivery to her of releases 
of their interests in the estate. 
W respectfully submit to this Court that it should 
be zealous to protect the interests of bonafide purchasers 
who had no notice of the conditions, but that it should 
not permit Mrs. Latses, who had full and complete notice 
of the conditions to be complied with before she coulrl 
acquire title, to profit from her own wrong. With full 
knowledge of the fact that she was not entitled to have 
all of the property of the estate, save $10,000.00 distri-
buted to her, she nevertheless committed the wrong of 
deeding the property over to herself. Mrs. Latses,, as 
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co-ad1ninistrator of the estate is in a position of trust 
and confidence to the heirs. As this Court has aptly 
stated in Graham vs. Street, 166 Pac. 2d, 524 at 536 "Eq-
uity will not allow a party in a relationship of trust and 
confidence, to profit fron1 his own wrong." She must 
not be per1nitted to keep Greenacre, Whiteacre and Red-
acre ~he should be required to transfer to the non-
resident heirs, their respective undivided interests. 
This Court should again examine the petition filed 
to initiate the proceeding now before this Court. The 
facts there set forth are the reasons why this court 
should not attempt to decide the rights as between Mrs. 
Latses and the heirs, without having before it an of the 
evidence that will be adduced. This Court should have 
before it full and complete evidence as to the value of 
the property left by the decedent. ·This Court should 
take judicial knowledge of the fact that the appraise-
ment made, both for the County inventory and for the 
State Inheritance Tax inventory, are not the same values 
that would be established in an adversary proceeding. 
The last item in the estate tax inventory (R 81) is a 
mortgage executed by Peter Latses and Hattie Latses, 
to secure a note in the amount of $6,000.00 together with 
interest. This note is valued in the inventory at $9,670-
00. Six days after the October decree was entered, a 
release of a mortgage was executed by Virginia Latses. 
This release was given to Peter Latses one of the heirs 
who accepted $2500.00 in payment of hi's interest in the 
estate. Evidence will be adduced to show that this re-
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lease of mortgage was given without any monetary con-
sideration. A certified copy of this release of mortgage, 
Instrument 1063725 in the Office of the County Recorder 
of Salt Lake County, is being filed with the record before 
this Court. 
It is respectfully submitted that with the full facts 
before this Court, a complete and equitruble disposition 
could be made of this case. 
POINT II. 
ON REHEARING THIS COURT REVERSED ITS FIRST 
OPINION BY ASSIGNING A DIFFERENT MEANING TO 
THE WORD "REFER" THAN TO THE WORD "INCORPO-
RATE" WHEN IN FACT THEY ARE SYNONYMOUS. WHEN 
AN ORDER REFERS TO AN EARLIER CONDITIONAL 
ORDER, IT IS THE SAME AS INCORPORATING THE 
EARLIER CONDITIONAL ORDER WITHIN ITSELF. 
The rationale of the Court's reversal of its original 
opinion is expressed in the single sentence: "Since the 
order here in question fails to put the inquirer upon 
notice that there are conditions precedent to its becoming 
final, it demands the respect to which a final decree is 
entitled under the statute." 
The Court finds the fact which is acknowledged by 
all the parties, that the earlier order of February 27, 
1945 does contain conditions. In the second paragraph 
of the opinion the Court states, "Upon rehearing our 
attention is called to the fact that the 'Order Approving 
Final Accounting and Distribution' does refer to the 
earlier order containing conditions .... " 
This Court states that it "reaffinns the principles 
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of law stated in its first opinion" and continues '"Though 
we need make no modification in the legal principles 
enunciated, we find it necessary to reconsider our con· 
struction of the facts." The Court proceeds with this 
process which it denominates "a construction of the 
facts" and concludes that the Order Approving Final 
Accounting "does refer to the earlier order containing 
conditions." In its original opinion the Court concluded 
that the Order Approving Final Accounting "incorpor-
ates a prior conditional order". Upon this untenable 
peg hands a diametrically opposite decision. This Court 
is holding that whereas notice is given when an order 
"incorporates by reference" a previous order that no-
tice is lacking when the subsequent order only "refers" 
to a previous order. This Court has taken a single well 
recognized legal phrase, divided it into two parts and 
assigned wholly different meaning and results to the 
constituent words of the phrase. lt seems to us that no-
tice is given regardless of whether the previous order is 
incorporated into a subsequent order by setting it out 
in haec verba or simply by referring to it. Each method 
gives the same notice. To incorporate means to cause 
to be "united in one body-to bodily insert". (To~edo 
Railroad Company vs. Cupp, 8 Indiana Appeals 388, 35 
Northeastern 703.) To refer is "to bring, carry, or send 
back, as to refer a student to a book" (State vs. Iwnes, 
89 Kansas 168, 130 Pacific 677 at 680.) Thus to refer 
a person to a particular order is to carry back the per-
son or his attention to that order. When one's attention 
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is referred to an order, he is being given notice of the 
contents of that order. The October Order refers to the 
order containing conditions, and those conditions are 
thus carried into the October 9, 1945 order. 
We respectfully submit that the reasons assigned 
by the Court to demonstrate that the October order is 
unconditional do not support its conclusion. In fact the 
Court's recognition of the fact that the "Order Ap-
proving Final Accounting .... does refer to the earlier 
order containing conditions" lends weight to the pro-
priety of its original opinion and militates against the 
conclusion reached by the Court in its second opinion. 
POINT III. 
THIS ·COURT FALLS INTO THE ERROR MR. JUSTICE 
WOLFE CAUTIONED. AGAINST IN THE ESTATE OF Mc-
LAREN. EVEN THOUGH THE RIGHTS OF HEIRS IN 
THEIR SEPARATE CAPACITIES AS CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES COULD BE PUT IN ISSUE IN A PROBATE PROCEED-
ING, PROCESS MUST BE SERVED ON THE HEIRS TO 
BRING THEM BEFORE THE COURT. IF NO PROCESS IS 
SERVED UPON THEM, IN THEIR SEPARATE .CAP A CI-
TIES AS CONTRACTING PARTIES, THEY HAVE NOT HAD 
THEIR DAY IN COURT AND THE OCTOBER ORDER 
WOULD BE A VOID ORDER. 
There is a great reluctance to file a petition fotr 
rehearing after the court has granted one rehearing, 
but our full duty to our client and to the court demands 
our best efforts to demonstrate to this court that its 
second opinion has fallen into the error which Mr. Jus-
t.ice Wolfe cautioned against in the case of, In re l\f c-
Laren's Estate, 90 Utah 340, 106 Pac 2d 766. Justice 
10 
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'Volfe·s op1n1on was referred to with approval by the 
entire court in the case, In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah, 
182 Pac 2d 111. 
A probate decree is conclusive only in so far as the 
decree decides a step in a probate proceeding. The Utah 
probate court states the several steps in a probate pro~ 
ceeding. Utah decisions permit non-probate matters to 
be considered in a probate proceeding, but require that 
process he served upon an heir, who is also a party to 
the non-probate proceeding. The rule in Barrett.e vs. 
Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 532, concerning notice, 
is not applicable when non-probate matters are before 
the court in a probate proceeding. 
In this case the petition (R 107) labeled as a peti-
tion for "distribution" is not a step in a probate pro-
ceeding. This may sound as a shocking and unrealistic 
statement to the court at first blush. 
In the course of this presentation, we expect to show: 
1. That the petition for final distribution does not 
plead the facts, looking to a "distribution" by virtue of 
the laws of succession requiring a determination of heir-
ship and the proportions or parts which each of the heirs 
is entitled to receive under the laws of succession. 
2. That on the contrary, it pleads a court approved 
agreement and asks distribution according to the court 
approved agreement in a manner other than required 
by the law of succession. 
3. That a proceeding for the approval of an agree-
11 
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ment to provide for distribution in a manner other than 
required by the laws of succession "is not a matter of 
probate". 
4. That since it is not a matter of probate, a cita-
tion must be served upon the persons to be affected by 
that determination, in order to bring that person before 
the court. 
5. That the probate notice is not sufficient for this 
purpose. 
6. That an adjudication of the rights and obligations 
of one of the parties to the court approved agreement, 
even if he be an heir, without having a process served 
upon him, is a void adjudication and judgment. 
We shall undertake to de1nonstrate that the October 
order is void because it violated the fundamental princi-
ple referred to by Mr. Justice Wolfe in the McLaren 
case, namely - that there has been an adjudication of 
title to property, in essence an equitable proceeding, by 
an adjudication in a probate proceeding, without the 
requisite personal service of a citation to secure the 
appearance before the court, of the other heirs. 
This court has held- (In re McLaren- ), supra 
"There seems to be no reason, under our 
Constitution and laws, why a district court in a 
probate proceeding may not when necessary to a 
due administration of an es,tate exercise poweri' 
which ordinarily pertain to equity jurisdiction 
so that the business may proceed without inter-
ruption or unnecessary delay" 
12 
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but J ustiee \Volfe continues- (page 773 of 106 P (2) 
''But again, warning should be sounded re-
garding the situation where a civil case is tried 
as a probate matter and probate matter tried as 
a civil case when they are respectively purely 
matters cognizable only as civil and as probate. 
It is one thing to determine a civil matter as a 
probate matter or a probate matter as a civil 
case and quite another thing to try a probate 
matter as a probate matter and a civil case as a 
civil case, although they may be addressed to the 
wrong divisions of the court. The first is a mat-
ter of substance; the second a matter of labels 
and ministerial adjustment. An example of the 
first class of cases would have been furnished if 
judgment had gone against Aurelius McLaren in 
the lower court when he was in a prooeeding in 
which he was in a probate by reason of the fact 
that he was an heir. The probate division by vir-
tue of its jurisdiction of the estate and the heirs 
for general purposes of administration could not 
in probate proceedings wherein the party was 
served by the mailing to him of a probate notice 
of the contest, have given judgment against him 
in a matter essentially civil in its nature." 
Likewise, Mr. Justice Wolfe notes the difference 
between a person being before the court as a heir and 
as a party to an equitable proceeding- (pg 770) 
"If the matter had gone against the assignee 
it may be that he might have shown that he was 
not personally served as required in a civil suit 
and therefore had not his day in court. He was 
served as an heir by a mailed probate notice, but 
he was not served as a party. He, however, pre-
13 
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vails and does not object that he was not pro-
perly in court as assignee. The appellant appear-
ed personally, therefore he cannot object that he 
did not have his day in court nor can he claim 
a new trial because his successful adversary was 
not properly served. The adversary adopts the 
judgment in his favor as assignee by making no 
objection and joining issue on appeal." 
The probate court cannot, in the course of a probate 
proceeding adjudicate a non-probate matter, depending 
for its jurisdiction over the heirs, upon the probate forms 
of notice, and without citing the heirs into court as par-
ties, by serving a proper citation upon them. 
"If in the course of probate and as a part 
of the probate procedure the court should ad-
judicate controverted matters involving title the 
result might not stand because probate is essen-
tially in rem. But if the parties were all before 
the court and the pleadings contained all the alle-
gations necessary to invoke the jurisdiction to 
try title and the court tried it as an action to 
quiet title, the mere fact that it was captioned in 
probate would not make the judgment invalid." 
(R 9771.) 
We apply this legal principle to this proceeding in 
probate consisting of the PETITION FOR APPROVAL 
OF FINAL ACCOUNT AND FOR DISTRIBUTION 
AND THE ORDER APPROVING FINAL ACCOUNT 
AND MAKING DISTRIBU'riON AND DISCHARG-
ING ADMINIS-TRATOR ( R 125) 
The petition for distribution did not present to the 
court a matter of probate. That petition invoked the 
jurisdiction of the court "to adjudicate controverted 
14 
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matters involving title," as Mr. Justice Wolfe states in 
the :McLaren case. We shall hereafter discuss the alle-
gations contained in the petition for distribution which 
shows that the courts jurisdiction was not invoked upon 
a matter of probate, but rather for a determination of 
the title to property and the rights and obligations under 
a contract between ~Irs. Latses and the other heirs. As-
suming, for the moment, that the matter passed upon 
was not a matter of probate and the record failed to dis-
close that process was served upon the heirs citing them 
to appear before the court to have the matter of title 
adjudicated, the October orderfili entered would be a void 
order for the reasorl:rthe three heirs did not have their 
day in court. 
"Upon death title to property of which the de~~dent 
died possessed, immediately passes to and vested ~ the 
heirs subject to the administration and payment of 
debts," Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29· Pac. 
2d 355. Section 7 4-4-2 UCA 53, is the statutory recogni-
tion of this principle. Our court has further held that 
title vests in the heirs "subject to divestment for debts 
and expenses," Jones v. St~ate Tax Commission, 99 Utah 
373, 104 Pac. 2d 210. 
"The purpose of an adjudication of heirship is not 
to vest title, hut to adjudicate where the title of the de-
cedent has already vested." Chamberlaitn v. Larson at 
page 351, 29 Pac. 2d. One of the two steps of "distribu-
tion" is to determine heirship. In the Latses case, no 
proceeding was taken to adjudicate where the title of 
the decedent had already vested. This involves more 
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than merely naming the persons who are heirs, because 
that alone determines nothing as to where the title has 
vested. To properly determine heirship, the proportions 
or parts which each heir as an heir has received, must 
be adjudicated. 
A decree of distribution is supposed to only declare 
a title and not create a title. However, the decree of 
distribution in this case created a title different from the 
title to the property established by the laws of succes-
sion. This attempted adjudication of title cannot stand 
and is a void judgment because the persons being di-
vested of the title were never personally served. In the 
case In re Ric·e's Estate, supra, the court recognized that 
its jurisdiction over the persons was acquired because 
the persons volWltarily submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the court. In the Latses case, the only notice given of 
the petition for the approval of the final account, as set 
forth in the record at page 105, is the ordinary ten day 
notice given in probate proceedings. No notice of this 
hearing was served upon the Attorney for the non-
resident heirs. Accordingly, if, as we trust we can dem-
onstrate in the next sub-heading, that this petition in-
voked the jurisdiction of the court on a matter involv-
ing the contract rights of the heirs, then the order is 
void. 
The order of distribution must be an order determin-
ing what property the law has cast upon each heir. The 
situation is analogous to the principle as to the relief 
which may be granted when a complaint is filed. When a 
complaint is filed and a summons served on a defendant, 
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the judgn1ent entered cannot go beyond the allegations 
of the complaint which has been served on the defendant. 
If the defendant fails to appear when the summons is 
served upon him, the judgment taken against him is 
lin1ited to the 1natters set forth in the complaint. Simi-
larly, in a probate, the original notice (which according 
to Barrette v. Whitney is sufficient to give the probate 
court jurisdiction) only involves the heirs that were 
being sun1moned before the court for all matters in pro-
bate. The heirs are justified in assuming that only 
matters of probate will be passed upon in that proceed-
ing. The ultimate end of a probate proceeding in a case 
of intestate succession is to adjudicate the two facts as 
to - No. 1. \Vhat persons have succeeded to the proper-
ty of the decedent, No. 2. What property the law of suc-
cession has cast upon each heir. If the heirs wish to 
enter into agreements to divide the property in a manner 
different than provided by the laws of succession, they 
have the right to enter into such a contract. Before courts 
pennitted non-probate matters to be tried in a probate 
proceeding, this agreement if controverted would have 
been the subject of an independent action. With the 
break down of the rule limiting probate proceedings to 
strictly probate matters and permitting adjudication 
of non-probate matters in a probate proceeding, such 
agreement of the heirs could be considered in a probate 
proceeding. However, when so considered, as stated in 
the case In re McLaren, it is necessary that process be 
served on the heirs in their new capacity as contracting 
parties. 
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In order to make clear the application of this prin-
ciple to the Latses estate, it is necessary to set forth 
the provisions of the Utah Probate Code, setting forth 
the steps in probate and secondly, to review the proceed-
ings in the Latses case to establish the fact that the pro-
ceedings taken were non-probate in character and there-
fore not binding in a case where process was not served 
upon the heirs who were necessary parties to the non-
probate proceeding. 
POINT IV. 
THE PETITION FOR FINAL DISTRIBUTION DID NOT 
INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT 
ON A MATTER OF PROBATE, NAMELY-DISTRIBUTION 
UNDER THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION. PROBATE IN-
CLUDES A DETERMINATION OF THE PERSONS WHO 
BY LAW OF SUCCESSION ARE DECREED TO BE THE 
DISTRIBUTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT 
AND SECONDLY AN ADJUDICATION OF THE PROPOR-
TIONS OR PARTS WHICH EACH HAS RECEIVED UPON 
THE DEATH OF THE ANCESTOR. A PROBATE PROCEED-
ING IS NOT COMPLETED UNTIL THESE STEPS ARE 
TAKEN. 
The last order in this case dated October 9, 1945 did 
not complete these probate proceedings. The petition 
upon which this order is based did not invoke the juris-
diction of the Court to make distribution in accordance 
with Section 75-12-7 and the decree does not fulfill the 
requirements of Section 75-12-8 in order to make it bind-
ing on all parties as directed by Section 75-12-9. 
The case In r.e Evans 42 Utah 282 130 Pacific 217: 
''A decree of distribution in probate pro-
ceedings, after due and legal notice by a Court 
having jurisdiction of the subject matter is con-
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elusive as to the fund, items, and matters covered 
by and properly included within the decree until 
set aside or modified by the Court entering the 
decree in the manner prescribed by law or until 
reversed on appeal." 
See also In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 P. (2) 
111. 
It is our contention that the alleged decree of dis-
tribution is in fact not a decree of distribution but a 
transfer of property by way of partition or a transfer of 
property as the result of an alleged contract between the 
heirs. The alleged distribution is not in conformity with 
the fundamental law set forth in the Probate Code and, 
therefore, it is a nullity. In re Evans supra at page 266 
of 130 Pacific: 
"A fact apparent from the mandatory record 
showing that fundamental law was disregarded 
in the establishment of the judgment will render 
it null and void for all purposes. And a judgment 
founded upon such a record is subject both to 
direct and collateral attack, and will, sua sponte, 
be noticed by Courts and acted upon by them 
without regard to the wishes or the relation of 
the parties named upon the record." 
By setting out the applicable statutes which a probate 
proceeding must follow, we hope to demonstrate to this 
Court that the alleged decree of distribution is void. 
Section 7 4-4-1. Succession is the coming in 
of another to take the property of one who dies 
without disposing of it by will. 
It should be particularly noted here that succession 
does not include the vesting of property as a result of 
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contract. Quarles v. Clayton, 87 Tenn. 308, Tenn. S.W. 
505, 3 LRA 170: 
"The word 'succession' is a word of technical 
meaning, and refers to those who by descent or 
will take the property of a decedent. It is a word 
which clearly excludes those who take by deed, 
grant, gift, or any form of purchase or contract." 
The rules of succession in this State are set forth in 
Section 7 4-4-5 which reads : 
"When any person having a title to an estate 
... dies without disposing of the estate by will, 
it is succeeded to and must be distributed, unless 
otherwise expressly provided in this title or in 
the Probate Code . . . in the following manner: 
(3) If the decedent leaves no issue, all of the es-
tate, real or personal, of which the decedent died 
seized or possessed, of not over $25,000 in value 
exclusive of debts and expenses, goes to the 
surviving husband or wife; and if over that value, 
$25,000 in value thereof goes to the surviving hus-
band or wife and the other half to the decedent's 
father and mother, in equal shares, and if either 
is dead, the whole of said half goes to the other; 
if there is no father or mother, then one-half of 
such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers 
and sisters of the decedent, and to the children or 
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister 
by right of representation:" 
The only exception where distribution may be made 
in a manner other than as set forth in Section 74-4-5 
appears in Section 74-12-15 which allows real estate to be 
distributed to the grantees of heirs. That Section reads: 
"Partition or distribution of the real estate 
may be made as provided in this chapter, although 
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some of the original heirs, legatees or devisees 
may have conveyed their shares to other persons, 
and such shares must be assigned to the persons 
holding the same in the same manner as they 
otherwise would have been to such heirs, legatees 
or devisees." 
(There may be a second exception set forth in Section 7-
12-9 on the subject matter of advancements made, which 
we should refer to later in connection with our discussion 
of the case of In re Howard's Estate, 159 Pacific 2d 586 
(Utah).) 
The foregoing statutes outline the only means by 
which property of an intestate is succeeded to. Section 
75-1-6 states "that the Judges of District and 'Supreme 
Court setting in probate matters shall exercise all such 
powers cons~tent with the provisions of this title, as are 
or may be conferred upon those Courts or Judges respec-
tively in other proceedings." 
This is the only source of the power ~ jurisdiction 
of the Judge of the Probate Court: "The source of the 
administrator's power and that of the Probate Court 
must be found in the Probate Code. In re Harris Estate, 
99 Utah 464, 105 Pacific 2d 461. The Sections of the 
Probate Code outlining the procedure by which these 
powers of the Probate Court are exer'cised and which 
are material.._. are here set out. S.ection 75-12-7: 
"Section 75-12-7: Upon the final settlement 
of the accounts of the executor ... upon the peti-
tion of the administrator or of any heir, legatee, 
or devisee, and upon notice the Court must pro-
ceed to distribute the residue of the estate in the 
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hands of the executor or administrator an1ong the 
persons who, by law, are entitled thereto; 
''Section 75-12-8: In the order or decree the 
Court must name the persons and the proportions 
or parts to which each shall be entitled, and such 
persons may demand and sue for and recover their 
respective shares from the executor or adminis-
trator or any person having the same in posses-
sion." 
As an addendum to Section 75-12-9 our statutes state 
the result of the entry of a decree, if the statutes are com-
plied with, and that result is set forth in these words: 
"and the final judgment or decree of the 
Court is binding on all parties interested in the 
estate, subject only to be reversed, modified, or 
set aside on appeal." 
In a probate proceeding only matters of probate may 
be determined and it shall be our function to show that 
in this case the necessary matters of probate have not yet 
been determined but that what is purported to be deter-
mined is something which is beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Probate Court, namely, to decide the relative rights 
of persons who happen to be heirs of an estate based up-
on a contract entered into by those heirs. 
As to the matters which may be heard on a petition 
for distribution we quote from the Utah case In re 
Howard's Estate, 159 Pacific 2d 586 at 590: 
"This matter came before the Court on the 
Executor's final account and for petition for dis-
tribution of the est.ate to the persons entitled to 
receiv.e the same, and for release and discharge 
of the executors. Proper notice was given on the 
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filing and time for hearing of both the account 
and the petition. This constituted notice not onlv 
of the hearing of the account and the petition, but 
of all issues and questions that might arise from 
objections thereto. All matters involved therein 
were before the Court for hearing and determina-
tion. Cases cited. Whether additional notice 
should be given is a matter of discretion of the 
Court below and in the absence of anything to 
show abuse of such discretion Appellate Court 
will not interfere. Cases cited. What matters 
may be adjusted on such hearing~ In general, the 
only items which can be properly settled in execu-
tor's account Ui matters relating purely to his 
administration of the estate; payment of debts 
and charges of administration; but upon the peti-
tion for distribution, the Court, in harmony with 
its general equitable power, can hear and 'adjust 
all matters between the executors and the lega-
tees and distributees, and give the former credit 
against the latter for all advances made to either 
under the terms of the will.' DCA 1943, Section 
102-12-9." (Note by appellant: This is the section 
referred to in our brief above which we mention-
ed might also be an exception to the distribution 
statutes permitting distribution to someone other 
than the heirs.) 
"Jurisdiction of 'matters of probate' includes 
determinations of what persons succeeded to the 
estate whether as devisees, legatees, and heirs 
and the part of amount of the estate to which each 
is entitled; Section 102-12-8 DCA 43 Martilnvich v. 
Marsica;no, 137 Cal. 354 70 Pacific 459." 
Several matters in this quote should be noticed. The 
first is-that the petition which invokes the jurisdiction 
of the Court is "A Petition for Distribution of the Estate 
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to the persons entitled to receive the same." The peti-
tion filed in this case was a petition for transfer of the 
assets to persons who claimed them under an antecedent 
contract. The Probate Court has no jurisdiction to hear 
a petition for the transfer of property to persons who 
claim the property in any capacity other than as heir, 
legatee, or devisee. It must not be thought that the rule 
is any different because of the fact that the same persons 
occupied the two separate relationships, namely, of heirs 
on the one hand and contracting parties on the other 
hand. See Parr v. Reyman, California, 12 Pacific 2d 440 
at 442: 
"In the other authority cited above it is point-
ed out that the 'Claimant was not an heir, legatee, 
or devisee of the deceased and had obtained his 
title during the pendency of the probate proceed-
ing through a deed or other legal conveyance from 
an heir, devisee, or legatee while in the present 
action each of the parties to the deed from Virgil 
to Willard was an heir of his deceased mother 
and was properly before the Probate Court at 
the time of the distribution of her estate .... " 
In answering the contention that the rule was differ-
ent when all of the parties were heirs of the estate and 
before the Court, the California Supreme Court said: 
"The second of the attempted differentia-
tions between the cited cases and the present case 
is equally unavailing. The quotes from the au-
thorities cited above and the cases themselves 
plainly show that the Probate Court has no juris-
diction over contracts or conveyances made by 
heirs, devisees, or legatees, either among them-
selves or with others' " (the underlining is by the 
Supreme Court of California in its decision). 
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This case of Parr v. Reyman will be discussed in this 
memorandum more fully in its course both through the 
District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. 
In the case of In re H award, supra the Court is out-
lining what may be heard on a petition for distribution 
of the estate to the persons entitled to receive the same. 
The petition referred to is strictly a probate petition and 
not as in the instant case a petition for transfer of all 
but $10,000.00 of the estate to one heir of the estate who 
claimed it by virtue of an alleged agreement and as a con-
tracting party and not as an heir. It is evident that it is 
not a petition for distribution because it does not meet 
the definition of a petition for distribution. See Robifn..-
son v. Fair, 128 U.S. 53, 9 Supreme Court 30, 32 L. Edi-
tion 415: 
"Distribution neither gives a new title to 
property nor transfers a distinct right in the es-
tate of the deceased owner, but is simply doolara-
tory as to the persons upon whom the law casts 
the succession, and the extent of their respective 
interests, while partition in most, if not all of its 
aspects, is a adversary proceeding in which the 
remedial right to the transfer of the property is 
asserted, and resulting in a decree which either 
ex proprio vigore or as executory accomplished 
such transfer." 
It is to he particularly noted that a petition such as 
was filed in the instant case gives rise to an adversary 
proceeding, separate and distinct from a matter in pro-
bate and, of course, a Probate Court does not have juris-
diction over these adversary proceedings excepting as 
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granted by Statute. This Court has already held that the 
proceeding did not attempt to comply with our statutory 
requirements for partition. Accordingly, the petition pre-
sented to the Court allegedly as a petition for distribu-
tion in fact was not a petition for distribution but instead 
asserted the rights of Mrs. Latses as a contracting party 
to receive all of the assets of the estate save $10,000.00. 
In the alleged petition for distribution Mrs. Latsis states 
that she contracted to receive all of the estate save $10,-
000. 
The petition and the order following it did not 
name the persons and the proportions or parts which 
each party was entitled to receive by law. The order 
named only the amount which each person was entitled 
to receive under and by virtue of an alleged contract. 
The matters herein argued are fully presented in a 
decision of the Courts of Oalifornia in the course of the 
progress of the case of P.arr v. Reyman, supra, both 
before the District Court of Appeals of California and 
the Supreme Court of California. The first opinion is in 
6 Pacific 2d 107. An opinion superseding the opinion by 
the District Court of Appeals, was written by the Su-
preme Court of California and it appears at 12 Pacific 
2d 440. In that case the question of the extent to which 
a probate decree was conclusive was raised. California 
has the same statute as our Section 75-12-8 and with an 
addition similar to the portion which we quoted above 
from Section 75-12-9 the California Statute in full reads 
as follows: 
"S.ection 1666 Code of Civil Procedure: In 
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the order or decree th.3 Court must name the per-
sons and proportions or parts to which each shall 
be entitled and such person may demand, sue for 
and recover their respective shares from the exe-
cutor or administrator or any person having the 
same in possession. Such order or decree is con-
clusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or de-
vis·ees, subject only to be reversed, set aside, or 
modified on appeal." 
When the case was before the District Court of Appeal 
the Court in its decision made certain assumptions as to 
what the record would show as to the decree of distribu-
tion. The District Court of Appeal held that the decree 
was conclusive because the only record that was before 
the Court indicated that the party to whom the property 
was distributed received the property in his capacity 
as heir of the estate rather than in his capacity as a con-
tracting party. The Court made this assumption as 
shown by the following statements of the Court taken 
from 6 Pacific 2d 109 : 
"This case is before us on the judgment rule 
alone. It is, therefore, our duty to assume that 
any and all evidence necessary to support the 
judgment was introduced in the Court below. 
There is nothing in the record that would tend to 
indicate that the distribution to Willard A. Parr 
in the decree in the estate of Elizabeth Parr, de-
ceased, was made to him as a purchas:er of the 
interest of his brother, Virgil, the appellant here." 
When the matter came before the Supreme Court of 
California it appeared that distribution was made to 
one who was an heir of the decedent but who received 
his interest in the estate by contract. The Supreme Court 
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of California interpreted its Code provision on distribu-
tion which is the same as that of Utah and quoted from 
an earlier case in California as follows: 
12 Pacific 2d 441: "Section 1666, Code Civil 
Proc., provides that a decree of distribution 'is 
conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or 
devisees;' but it is conclusive against them only 
as heirs, legatees, or devisees, - only so far as 
they claim in such capacities. The probate court 
has jurisdietion to determine who are the legal 
heirs of a deceased person who died intestate, and 
who are the devisees or legatees of one who died 
testate; but its determination of such matters 
does not create any new title. It n1erely declares 
the title which accrued under the law of descent, 
or under the provisions of the will. The decree 
of distribution has nothing to do with contracts 
or CO'YIIV·eyances which may hav.e b,een made by 
heirs, devis.ees, or legatees of or about their 
shares of the estate, either among themselv·es or 
with others. Such matters are not before the pro-
bate court, and over them it has no jurisdiction. 
An heir may contract about or convey the title 
which the law had cast upon him on the death of 
his ancestor; and the validity of force of such con-
tract is not affected by the fa:ct that a probate 
court afterwards, by its decree of distribution, de-
clares his asserted heirship and title to be valid." 
Our courts have in innumerable cases affirmed 
this do~trine. Estate of Burton, 93 Cal. 459, 461, 
29 P. 36; Estate of Brudick, 112 Cal. 387, 391, 
44 P. 734; Estate of Crooks, 125 Gal. 4·59, 58 P. 
89; Martinovich v. Marsicano, 137 Cal. 354, 356, 
70 P. 459; Estate of Ryder, 141 Cal. 366, 74 P. 993; 
Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 105 P. 981; 
Estate of Howe, 161 Cal. 152, 118 P. 551; Estate 
of Lyon 163 Cal. 803, 127 P. 75; Archer v. Harvey, 
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16-! Cal. 27-1, 128 P. --UO; Shaw v. Paln1er, 65 Cal. 
App. -!41, 22-! P. 106. 
In the case of Martinovich v. Marsicano, 
supra, this court stated the law applicable to the 
question now under discussion as follows: 
'' 'Matters of probate' include the ascertainment 
and determination of the persons who succeed 
to the estate of a decedent, either as heir, devisee, 
or legatee, as well as the amount of proportion 
of the estate to which each is entitled, and also the 
construction or effect to be given to the language 
of a will; but do not include a determination of 
claims against the heir or devisee for his portion 
of the estate arising subsequent to the death of 
the ancestor, whether such claim arises by virtue 
of his contact or in invitum; nor is the determin-
ation of conflicting claims to the estate of an heir 
or devisee, or whether he has conveyed or assign-
ed his share of the estate a 'matter of probate.'" 
(2, 3) An attempt is made to distinguish 
the line of authorities just cited from the present 
case. In the first place, it is contended that the 
appellant in this action is not claiming under 
the decree of distribution but adversely to it, 
while in certain of the authorities relied upon 
above the claimant is a grantor 'Claiming under a 
decree of distribution advers~ly to the terms of 
his prior grant. In the other authorities cited 
above it is pointed out that the claimant was not 
an heir, legatee, or devisee of the deceased, and 
had obtained his title during the pendency of the 
probate proceeding through a deed or other legal 
conveyance from an heir, devis·ee, or legatee, 
while in the present action each of the parties 
to the deed from Virgil to Willard was an heir 
of his deceased mother, and was properly before 
the probate court at the time of the distribution 
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of her estate. As to the first of these attempted 
differentiations between this case and the author-
ities cited, we are unable to see any difference 
in principle, in so far as the question of the con-
clusive effect of a decree of distribution is con-
cerned between parties where the grantor is 
claiming under a decree of distribution notwith-
standing his grant deed divesting himself of all 
interest in the estate, and a grantor claiming ad-
versely to the decree of distribution, which dis-
tributes the property conveyed by him in accord-
ance with the terms of his grant. It is claimed 
that in cases where a grantor is 'Claiming under a 
decree of distribution adversely to his deed, they 
might have rested upon the broad principle of 
law that a grant deed passes subsequently aquired 
title. Admitting for the present purpose that 
those cases might have been so decided, the deci-
sions therein show that they were not. The deci-
sions rested upon another equally well-recognized 
principle of law that the probate court has no 
jurisdiction over "contracts or conveyances which 
may have been made by heirs, devisees, or lega-
tees, of or about their shares of the estate, either 
among themselves or with others. Such matters 
are not before the probate court, and over them it 
has no jurisdiction." Chever v. Ching Hong Poy, 
supra. ·or, as was said in Martinovich v. Marsci-
ano, supra, "'Matters of probate' * * * do not 
include a determination of claims against the heir 
or devisee for his portion of the estate arising 
subsequent to the death of the ancestor, whether 
such claim arises by virtue of his contract or in 
invitum. * * *" 
The second of the attempted differentiations 
between the cited cases and the present case is 
equally unavailing. The quotations from the au-
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thorities cited above and the cases themselves 
plainly show that the probate court has no juris-
diction over contracts or conveyances made by 
heirs devisees, or legatees, "either among them-
selves or with others." 
Thus, in the decision of this case before the District 
Court of Appeal of California and the 'Supreme Court of 
the State of California we find a history which is the 
reverse of the history of the instant case before this 
Court. The second opinion of this court in effect follows 
the District Court of Appeal of California and the ori-
ginal opinion in its result, if not in its reasoning, follows 
the Supreme Court of California. It should be noted 
here that Section 75-12-15 UCA 53 does give jurisdiction 
to the Probate Court to distribute property to persons 
other than the heirs only when there is a valid convey-
ance made in conformity with the requirements of the 
statutes transferring the interest of an heir to a third 
person. It must be noted, however, that in the petition 
upon which the alleged decree of distribution is based 
that there is no allegation of a conveyan·ce by one of the 
heirs to the other heirs so as to give the Court jurisdic-
tion to make distribution to a person other than the one 
upon whom the law cast the title. In the instant case it 
is clear that the petition directed to the Court set forth 
the alleged rights of the one heir, Virginia Latses, to 
secure a transfer of all of the assets of the estate save 
$10,000.00 to her by reason of the fact that she had 
entered into a contract with the other heirs to accom-
plish that. The petition does not set forth that she is 
requesting distribution to herself of all the property 
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save $10,000.00 in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 7 4-4-5. Her petition does not set forth that she 
is asking for the property as the sole successor to it but 
on the contrary, that she is asking for the property by 
virtue of the fact that she entered into a contract subse-
quent to the death of the decedent to receive that prop-
erty. There is no allegation in the petition that the three 
non-resident heirs assigned or conveyed their interests in 
the estate to her so that she could be entitled to claim 
distribution of that part of the property normally dis-
tributable to the three non-resident heirs to herself by 
virtue of the assignment and conveyance by the three 
non-resident heirs of their interests in the estate to her. 
We conclude, therefore, that because there was no 
petition for distribution as required by the Probate Code 
but rather a petition to obtain contractual rights which, 
not being a matter of probate, passed upon without 
process, was void, that there has not yet been entered a 
decree of distribution in this estate. Until a de·cree of 
distribution is entered, the cause of action given the the 
heirs to claim their share of the estate has not arisen. 
Section 75-12-8 gives the rights to the heirs to demand 
and sue for and recover their respective shares from the 
administrator when the decree names the persons who 
are the heirs of the estate and the proportions or parts 
of the estate to which each heir, as an heir, is entitled. 
Until such an order is entered, the heirs do not have their 
cause of action to demand and sue for and re·cover their 
respective shares. 
The petition filed and the order based upon the peti-
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tion were not carrying out matters of probate but were 
asking the Court to adjudicate the rights of one of the 
heirs as a contracting party. Such a matter is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Probate Court and such is a void 
order, without the requisite service of process; that at-
tempted proceeding was an adversary proceeding which 
could have been brought as a partition proceeding if the 
single heir who took the estate, tfA.Yf $10,000.00 would 
have been willing to abide the judgment of the referees 
appointed by the Court as to how the estate should be 
partioned. Evidently they were not willing to bring this 
matter before the Court in the manner authorized by 
the Statute. They had the alternative right of proceeding 
in an independent action to enforce their alleged rights 
under the contract if they considered they had any, or 
under our relaxed rule of presenting the matter to the 
probate side of the court, but only after the service of 
process to bring the parties before the court. Instead, 
the heir persuaded and induced the Court to enter a judg-
ment based upon a contract right which judgment was 
directly opposite and contrary to the judgment which 
the Court, should have entered. It is clear that if the rules 
of law had been followed and this alleged contract sub-
mitted to a Court for its consideration in an adversary 
proceeding; as it should have been, that a Court reading 
the stipulation and agreement would have entered a 
judgment directly opposite to the judgment entered. No 
opportunity was given for an a:dversary proceeding. 
Process should have been served on the three non-
resident heirs or at least on their attorney to be present 
at the hearing. 
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Even though the October decree passed upon a 
matter of probate, the order is void inasmuch as no pro-
cess was served upon the other heirs, in a proceeding 
brought to modify an order of court which was final and 
conclusive. 
This court's second opinion states as a principle of 
law, "that counsel appointed to represent absent heirs 
has not the power of an Attorney in F'act to bind the 
heirs by his own action, though ratification of such action 
by the probate court can make it binding." Accordingly, 
this court of last resort in this State, establishes that the 
"order approving petition and stipulation for settlement 
with certain heirs" is binding upon the parties, namely-
Mrs. Latses on the one hand and the other four heirs on 
the other hand. In this order it is recited "the court finds 
the facts as set forth in the petition to be correct" and 
then orders ''that the stipulation ·and petition entered in-
to and pres en ted by and between the parties herein be, 
and the same is hereby, approved and confirmed," and 
"it is further ordered that the said agreement and distri-
bution shall become binding and conclusive as to each of 
the four said heirs upon the acceptance by him, or by his 
heirs-at-law of said payments. 
It is further ordered that the said heirs shall furnish 
or that their Attorney shall procure from the said recipi-
ents of said payments, a proper re·ceipt therefor and an 
assignment and relinquishment of all interest in this said 
estate and a release of the administrator herein, which 
receipts and relinquishments shall be delivered to the 
administrator." (R. 97). 
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One of the terms of the stipulation which was ap-
proved by the court reads, (R .. 87) "That the said pay-
ment and settlement shall become binding and conclusive 
as to each of the four said heirs, Peter J. Latses, William 
J. Latses, Nick G. Latses and J'ohn G. Latses, upon the 
acceptance of his portion of the said estate and the exe-
cution of the necessary instruments to rs~'CCtherefore, 
and to assign his said interest and release f1J&said estate. 
That the said settle1nent shall become binding as to 
each of the said heirs accepting the same and executing 
such instruments." Thus the agreement was, that unless 
each of the four heirs executed releases and assignments 
of their interests in the estate, they were each to receive 
their full distributive share allowed them by the laws of 
descent. This is the converse of saying, that if they do 
execute the releases and assignments, they are each to 
receive only $2500.00 or that they are not to take accord-
ing to the laws of descent. Thus, in addition to the statu-
tory right to the share alloted to them by the statute of 
descent, they had a contract right to their full share. Mrs. 
Latses petitioned the court to give the other four con-
tracting parties, the amount they had conditionally con-
tracted to accept, freed from the condition of executing 
the releases and assignments of their interests. 
That decree of F'ebruary 27, 1947 is conclusive 
upon the matters adjudicated. Generally speaking, an 
adjudication as to any step iu the administration is not 
subject to review in a subsequent stage of the admini-
stration., 1 Bancroft Probate Practice, 2d Ed, Page 175, 
Note 15. "Intermediate decrees are often final as to mat-
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p,../"0..,..,- b " 1 B f ters wl1ich propect to be concluded there y, ancro t 
Probate Practice, 2d Ed, Page 167, Note 1. 
It is implicit that even though a decree or judgment 
which adjudicates the rights of parties is called into 
question or is sought to be reviewed or modified at a 
later date, that process must be served upon all the par-
ties sought to be effected by the modification. Unless 
process is served, the parties to the original order have 
not had their day in court on the question of whether 
the original order should be modified or changed. See 
Ada.ms v. Lewis, 111 Utah 387, 180 Pac. 2d 865. In that 
case, the court confirmed a sale of real property for cash 
and subsequently, without further notice to the heirs, 
ordered that the party purchasing the property could 
apply towards the purchase price, the value of a distri-
butive share of the estate. The court held that notice was 
required before the first order could be changed. 
We submit that the February Order was conclu-
sive; that there is no way to change the existing order 
~fTi416- by a direct attack. This can be accomplished only by 
serving process upon the heirs-those whose rights are 
sought to be affected. 
In the Latses case, there was no service on the heirs 
and no service on the Court Appointed Attorney for the 
heirs. Not even a copy of the petition that was filed 
to undo the judgment already entered, was served upon 
the Court Appointed Attorney for the heirs. How can 
any Court change a properly docketed judgment of the 
Court without serving any kind of process on any partyt 
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POINT V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
Taking away the right vested in the heirs by the 
February decree, without the service of a citation upon 
them, constitutes the taking of property without due 
process of law. That February decree is itself a decree 
of distribution. It ordered that all of the property of 
the estate, save $10,000.00, should be distributed to Vir-
ginia Latses, but only on condition that assignments were 
executed. The inference in the order is that if the assign-
ments were not executed, that distribution must be in 
accordance with the laws of succes~sion. 
The petition filed in September 1945 and upon which 
is based the October order, did no~ invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the Court to change the February order. No cita-
tion was ever served on the non-resident heirs or the 
court appointed Attorney, to give them notiee of any 
proceeding to change or modify that decree. The order 
modifying the decree was entered without service of a 
citation and therefore, constitutes the taking of property 
without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of 
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States . .Es17~ .t cs;;"AI iJ-al/ (/. .s. ~4/1, 61 .S.t!.tf. /2.1.3 
;A-t'" /~/t' 
POINT VI. 
EVEN IF THE COURT ADHERES TO ITS OPINION 
THAT THE OCTOBER ORDER IS A VALID PROBATE DE-
CREE AND CONCLUSIVE, THE NON-RESIDENT HEIRS 
HAVE PLEADED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE 
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AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATORS AND OF FRAUD AND 
COLLUSION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATORS ON THE 
ONE HAND AND MRS. LATSES AS ONE OF THE HEIRS 
ON THE OTHER HAND. 
This Court has assumed that the non-resident heirs, 
upon failing to reeeive their distributive share of the es-
tate have not pleaded fraud and collusion. Paragraph 8 
(R. 163) pleads that the administrators (one of whom 
Mrs. Latses, was the heir taking all of the estate save 
$10,000.00) had personal knowledge of the contents of 
the F;ebruary order, and that it was in full force and ef-
fect and a binding court order to distribute according 
to the laws of succession unless assignments of the heirs 
interests were presented and filed. The petition here 
passed upon further alleges (R. 165); "That the admini-
strators and the attorney appointed by the court to tep-
resent the non-resident heirs knew that the distribution 
to the widow of all of the assets other than the sum of 
$8,000.00 was to be made only when the order of court 
was complied with, namely, when each of the heirs ac-
cepted payment of the proferred settlement and after 
they deeded over their interest in the real property to the 
widow," and at (R. 166); "That the remaining $1,500.00 
of this contemplated settlement to each non-resident heir 
was never out of the posse8sion of the administrator, 
the Utah Savings & Trust Company and that it well knew 
that the non-resident heirs had not accepted the payment 
and settlement, and had not assigned their respective in-
terests to widow; that it had this sum in its possession 
on October 9, 1945, and had not then attempted to trans-
mit the respective sums of the additional $1,500.00 of the 
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proferred settlement. That the Utah Savings & Trust 
Company well knew that it was not authorized to distri-
bute the rest of the estate to the widow unless it had re-
ceipts and assignments, but nevertheless and in violation 
of the order of the court, and in collusion with the widow 
who was the co-administrator of the estate, the Utah 
Savings & Trust Company did distribute all of the prop-
erty of the estate to her. The administrators were aware 
of the fact that the said order of final distribution pro-
vided ~he remaining assets of the estate were to be 
distributed to the widow only 1!1:; the payments and 
distribution aforesaid. The payments and distribution 
aforesaid were -never made. That the Utah Savings & 
Trust Company well knew that it was impossible to cor-
rE(>ond with the non-resident heirs at that time because 
of existing guerilla warfare in Greece. That even if 
it would have been possible to correspond with them, 
it probably would have required at least thirty (30) days 
to forward the necessary funds and to receive an acknow-
ledgement thereof, and the necessary receipts, even if the 
correspondence was carried on by air mail. That in 
violation of the order of the court, and in complete disre-
gard of the rights of the heirs, the administrators on the 
very same day as the order of distribution was signed, 
and without attempting to forward the proceeds of the 
proferred settlement to the heirs, delivered all of the rest 
of the estate excepting the· sum of $8,000.00 to the widow. 
That this act of the administrators was collusive and 
made in an effect to force and compel the non-resident 
heirs to accept an unfair and grossly insufficient settle-
ment." 
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This proceeding is n1aintainable in this probate case, 
in which the facts giving rise to the cause of action arose. 
The three non resident heirs did not receive their proper 
distributive share of the estate because of the negligence 
of the administrators and their disregard of the courts 
order of February 27, 1945. This brings the ease square-
ly within the rule of Tiller v. Norton, ------ Utah. _____ , 253 
Pac. 2d 618 ( 1953). The rule is better set forth in the 
case of Welch v. Flory, 200 Northeastern 900, 106 ALR 
813. It holds that "a decree directing a distribution of 
the estate does not protect the executors or administra-
tors against the claims of persons entitled to share in the 
distribution who have been omitted from the order as a 
result of negligence on the part of the executors or ad-
ministrators." 
In Welch v. Flory, in the probate proceedings, an 
order was made to correct the decree to order the ad-
ministrator to make payments to the heirs of his distri-
butive share and secondly at the same time it established 
the rights of the administrator to collect the amount of 
the overpayment made to each of the distributees. No 
injustices to innocent third parties would result, if 
proceedings were permitted in this action to accomplish 
the same result. Thus, the result would be exactly what 
it should have been under proper probate proceedings. 
With reference to Tiller v. Norton, it is our opinion 
that that case is not authority for the proposition that 
an administrator can distribute less than the entire dis-
tributive share of an estate to which an heir is entitled 
and be protected. It is only authority for the proposition 
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that when the court record shows that there is only one 
heir, when in fact there are three, the other two heirs 
being unknown, that the administrator is not liable for 
failing to distribute to the two unknown heirs. The case 
1s completely distinguishable from the Latses case, in 
that the heirs were all known and there was no element 
of faci$lacking to enable the court to enter a judgment 
that would completely adjudicate the rights of the par-
ties. 
We believe that the case of Short v. Thompson, 5·6 
Idaho 361, 55 Pac. 2d 163, (cited in the footnote), is not 
substantial authority. In this case, (at page 167 of 55 
Pac. 2d) the Idaho Court seems to contemplate that the 
decision would be different even in just such a case as the 
Latses case. At the top of the page, just referred to, the 
court cites the case of Gile v. Wood, 32 Idaho 752 at 88 
Pac. 36, where the court held that a judgment. of the 
court entered upon a matter upon which the jurisdiction 
of the court was not invoked is a void judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully urge this court to again give full 
consideration to the problems raised in the several briefs 
that have been filed. It is, of course, necessary that there 
be an end to litigation but the end must be an equitable 
one. Courts must not dispose of cases simply because the 
litigation may be vexing. This case has only been before 
this court on the pleadings and it has not had a long judi-
cial history. It is true that some 7 or 8 years elapsed 
hetween the entry of the order of October 1945 and the 
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commencement of these pleadings. That, however, is no 
reason to reject the efforts of these non-resident heirs 
to secure just treatment in the courts of this State. 
The Court's opinion on rehearing may be more far 
reaching than can be comprehended at the moment. For 
example-A & B, the two heirs of an estate being prO-
bated in San Juan County are entitled to undivided one-
half interests in uranium claims, Nos. 1 to 10 inclusive 
and they make an agreement between themselves that A 
should take claims No. 1, 2 and 3 and B the remaining 
7 claims and such agreement is approved by the Court 
and provided that this agreement was to be effective only 
if A would execute assignments to B and B would execute 
assignments to A. It is then found that claims 1, 2, and 
3 are productive and claims 4 to 10 inclusive are wholly 
unproductive. B is out in the mountains working the 
productive claims and stay3 away from his home in 
Monticello for a full year. He knows that he has not 
executed any assignments of his interest in these produC-
tive claims 1, 2 and 3 and he assumes that he has a one-
half undivided interest in these claims. A, the admini-
strator petitioned the court to distribute the estate, alleg-
ing in the petition that an agreement has been made and 
approved by the court by which A is to receive claims 
1, 2, and 3 and B the remaining claims. H doesn't plead 
nor prove that B executed the assignments. A ten day 
statutory notice of the hearing of the petition is mailed 
to B's home, but there is no one there to receive it. Never-
theless, the court on A's petition distribute·s the valuable 
claims, 1, 2, and 3 to A and the worthless claims 4 to 10 
inclusive to B. 
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One year later B returns from the mountains where 
he has mined $1,000,000.00 worth of ore from the claims 
1, 2 and 3 and finds that a decree of distribution was 
entered distributing the three valuable claims to A and 
the 7 worthless claims to B. Is this decree to he held 
conclusive against B and deprive him of his one-half 
undivided interest in the good claims~ Title to an un-
divided one-half interest in these good claims vested in 
him upon the death of his aneestor. There was no pro-
ceeding to divest him of his title. 'Such an opinion as the 
second opinion in this case would uphold the distribu-
tion of the good claims to A and thus take his property 
from him without due process of law. 
We respectfully submit that that is what happened 
in the Latses case. If this opinion of the court is per-
mitted to stand, that type of a prohate proceeding will 
be sustained in the Latses case and is likely to be sus-
tained in many future probate cases. Of course, it can be 
said that when another such case is presented, the court 
could. over-rule the decision in the Latses case, but that 
is tantamount to this court applying sound principles of 
law to one case and not to another, making the principle 
of "stare decisis" useless. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WIDTE, ARNOVITZ & S.MITH 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS. & 
MATTS SON 
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~~~~····· 
Cornelia S. Lund, Recorder S. r. . .Coun'y, U\aia 
lookS'() 
1Page " P.er-...5!31/-- ;z~'-a7 
RELEASE OF MORTGAGE 1 
The un0ersigned 1 Virginia Latsis, hereby represents 
and declares tr~t that certain mortgage between Peter Latsis 
and Hattie Latsis, his wife, as mortga~ors, to James Latsis, 
~ortgagee, recorded November 5, 1931 in Book "91", page 294, 
as Entry No. 685741, in the records of the County Recorder ot 
Salt Lake County was, by general decree, in the matter of the 
~state of James John Latsis, No. 25644 in the District Court ot 
the Third Judicial District,..in and for Salt Lake County, dis· 
tributed to the said undersigned, and she is the holder and o~• 
thereof. 
The said James John Latsis was the same person as Jamee 
Latsis, the said mortgagee. 
The property described in said mort~ge is situate ~ 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 65.? Rods East from the Northwest 
corner of Section 34, Township 2 South, Range l West, 
Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 32.4 Rods, thence 
East 49.4 Rods, thence North 32.4 Rods, thence Weat 
49.4 Rods to the place of beginning. Containing 
10 acres, more or less. 
The undersigned further acknowledges that the said 
mortgaee hes been fully paid and satisfied, and the same is 
hereby released and discharged. 
~ 7 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss • 
•• , CO~Y OF SALT LAKE 
~ ./:~·:or.·::~J~-/-·.,.. on the / t 5day of ~ , 1945, personally app.-
~ :·.; U U L be.ko~e me VIRGIN!Al:"ATSIS, t &~gner ot the foregoing inatn-
• ;'' ~.~~IS$~~_; whO duly acknowledged to me that 8he executed the S&mlo 
•• 0 ... ,. •. 
,.· .. co"' t:-.,'l.: ~~ ---4? 
•'" ·· .. :_:.).\~_ .. ··, ~ ~:~ ~ 
·, t'11r;"·:··fl3 commission exp:::-:::= ·~- ___ ··::;~c:::.L . . l , 
;::f-
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE I 
C!!erttftrntt 
ss. 
I, Hazel Taggart Chase, Recorder in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original 
...... !1~1.~9-~ft ... Q.f. .. ~~Qr.:t;..eai!'.e ... -:-: .. Y.5.r.r..i.n1a ... 1~.t~.i~ ... f.or ... :!eme.~ .. .!J£t.~.ie ... t.Q ... P.e.:t~.r ... anct ... Ha.ttie .. JJ.at.aia ... ~ 
No ........ 10.63.7.25. .................................. , as appears of record in my office. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed my official seal, this ...... l2tb .................. day 
of ............... ?.~P.:It~.~J?.~r. ............................. , A. D. 19 .. ~.l ............. . 
HAZEL TAGGART CHASE. COUNTY RECORDER 
............................... Deputy Recorder 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
